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Abstract
The possibility for transnational democratic representation is a huge topic. This article is restricted
to exploring two unconventional aspects. The first concerns ‘the representative claim’, extending
one critical part of previous analysis of the assessment of such claims, especially by largely
unelected transnational actors. The second, which strongly conditions the account of the first,
concerns ‘slow theory’ as the way to approach building democratic models and, in particular, to
approach transnational democratic representation.
Keywords: slow politics; slow theory; transnational representation; democracy and
representation; slow movement
INTRODUCTION
Where any political dispute, confrontation, process, or issue is engaged, one
unavoidable and often conflicted question is ‘who speaks for whom here, and
why?’ Arguably, the question has special pertinence today for ‘global’ or transna-
tional disputes, with their relative absence of familiar institutions of representative
democracy and their anchoring effect on the dynamic play of representative claims
and practices.1 Consider, for example, the myriad claims at play at the UN Climate
Change Conference 2009 in Copenhagen*from national governments, transna-
tional governance bodies, pressure groups, business and scientific organisations,
activists, and so on*asserting their right or capability to speak for people, animals,
flora, and planet.
The possibility for transnational democratic representation is a huge topic. This
article is restricted to exploring two unconventional aspects.2 The first concerns ‘the
representative claim’, extending one critical part of previous analysis of the
assessment of such claims,3 especially by largely unelected transnational actors.
*Correspondence to: Michael Saward, Department of Politics, Open University, UK. Email:
m.j.saward@open.ac.uk
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The second, which strongly conditions the account of the first, concerns ‘slow
theory’ as the way to approach building democratic models and, in particular, to
approach transnational democratic representation. I start by explaining the idea of
slow theory and what motivates its deployment given the topic at hand.
As an entry point, consider briefly the thinking behind two recent works of art.
The first is by Ann-Sofi Siden called My Country (Somewhere in Sweden), part of the
Moderna Exhibition at Stockholm’s Modern Museum in 2010. Using moving images,
stills, and sound on a number of adjacent screens, the work depicts a slow ride on
horseback over several weeks, heading south through Sweden. The second work is an
offsite project from Milton Keynes Gallery (UK) by Andrew Cross called VIA,
described by the gallery as a work that ‘contradicts the high-speed reality of
contemporary road travel by reducing the experience, quite literally, to walking pace.
A single-take video of the journey from London to Milton Keynes slowed down to
12 hours, VIA converts the rapid glances and everyday repetition of the road into
extended moments of speculation and perceptual dislocation’.4
These two works convey varied ideas, one of which is that the speed at which we
move through a space alters our perceptions of it. We may be accustomed to
perceiving spaces in a certain way from, for example, driving on a motorway, but
Cross shows us that there are a great many details and features of the natural and
built environment that, for example, motorway speeds and the perceptual needs and
habits they induce act to obscure or hide. Slowing down changes what we (can) see
and what we think we see, along with its significance. Siden, similarly, shows us that
moving slowly through town and country may prompt an unusual, perhaps
unsettling, sense of unfamiliarity with otherwise familiar features of life and
landscape. Both works suggest that dislocating visual and interpretive effects may
accompany unaccustomed changes of speed and that new modes of reflection may be
induced by slowing down. The slow view of the passing country is less flattened or
homogenised than our common perceptions fostered by motorised ‘social accelera-
tion’ might suggest.5
Different speeds facilitate different levels and intensities of perception. There is in
principle no ‘better’ or ‘normal’ speed*better and normal are relational (better for
what? normal to whom?). But there is little doubt that habituation to speed-induced
perceptions can normalise and naturalise an otherwise absent spatial featurelessness.
Speed may induce ways of not seeing, knowingly or otherwise. The artworks suggest
the importance of particular contextual features, overlooked details, and the
distinctiveness of place and space.
SPEED AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY
There is an analogy to be drawn with speed and perception in the construction and
application of political theory*especially democratic theory, which is my focus
here.6 My argument is that, sometimes, democratic theory needs to be slow theory.
‘Fast’ and ‘slow’ theory are unfamiliar ideas. Sometimes I use these terms literally, at
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others metaphorically. Fast and slow theory are relational notions; there can be many
instances of both and they are located on a spectrum of possibilities. There is
considerable overlap between slow theory and other approaches that stress
particularity and difference; I hope to show that the idea of slow theory helps to
draw together a range of distinct and important reasons for theorists to pause over
political particularity.
Theory may be understood as being slow in different ways, and I would emphasise
three: first, that it is done slowly; second, that its conclusions recommend slow action
or implementation; and third, that it makes explicit its own implied arguments about
speed as they bear on the reach or breadth of its applicability. By contrast, theory may
also be understood as fast in each of these ways. The following sections briefly take
up these points.
Speed and the practice of theory
Slow thinking generally*for example, that associated with the Slow Food and
Cittaslow (Slow Cities) movements7*highlights questions of the appropriateness of
how things are produced, by whom, where, why, and in what time frame. Here, the
questions are turned onto the production of democratic theory itself.8 What might it
mean for theory to be produced slowly*in terms of its methods, character,
collaborative processes, and recommendations? Slow theory stresses close considera-
tion and mindfulness of the particularities of locality and culture, pausing over
situated and customary values, and taking account of a range of opinions and
judgements. It may involve, for example, immersive study of the meanings of
‘democracy’ in a distinctive non-Western context.9 It acknowledges that the speed of
theory production may alter the very perceptibility of polities, peoples, and problems.
Questions of who creates democratic theory are raised; individual authors may
produce it, but it may also be regarded as a co-production with professional and
community collaborators including the subjects of research.10 In the doing of
slow theory, process can modify content; a theory is pieced together in conjunc-
tion with a context including but not limited to other groups and actors in that
context, rather than hatched independently of and subsequently applied to that
context.11
Slow approaches to theory, then, embrace their own engagement with and
production of situated knowledge.12 Situatedness is normally taken to be an issue
of place or placement; it is, I suggest, equally an issue about time and speed; the
situated producer of democratic models will recognise the need to survey political
terrain slowly (deliberately, mindfully) in order to understand the distinctiveness of
locality. Slow theorists, for example, would likely endorse Walzer’s defence of ‘thick’
or maximalist conceptions of justice, or of democracy, whose content reflects a
patient attentiveness to particularities of culture and place.13 Producing slow
democratic theory is an immersive process, recognising and embracing the impact
of situatedness on perception.
Slow theory
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By way of contrast, towards the fast theory end of the spectrum the production of
democratic theory is interpreted more as an independent process of detached model
production. Fast theory minimises acknowledgment of the impact of the situatedness
of observers. In this view, the theorist’s situatedness*of language, culture, training,
and so on*can and ought to be transcended. For example, the appropriate
assumptions about essential human characteristics can give rise to more or less
universal conceptions of democracy*consider Downs’s ‘economic model’ or even
the singular assumptions characterising human motivations in John Rawls’s A Theory
of Justice.14 A contemplative detachment from specific subjects or sites is, in the
domain of fast theory, both necessary and feasible.
For fast theory, spatial and temporal specificity matters less than a model’s internal
consistency. In a democratic theory, is the conception of democracy’s value followed
through clearly and convincingly in its account of democratic institutions, for
example? Questions of who can and who should carry out theoretical work also arise.
Fast theory’s conception of the agency of the theorist often mirrors that of the classic
singular and somewhat heroic ‘great thinker’, downplaying theory as co-creation.
Further, fast theory’s ready characterisation of theory production as ‘normative’ is
revealing. What does it mean to produce democratic theory in a normative frame?
Among other things, I suggest, it carries an (often under examined) assumption that
we can have access to sufficiently acontextual normative grounds for the work of
theory. The notion that there is*if we are smart enough to discover and defend it*a
single best normative argument for democracy is closely linked to such an
assumption.
In short, democratic theory production in fast theory mode sees no significant
external constraint on speedy production. Time is merely a natural constraint on the
independent or comparatively detached work of the lone theorist. The principles and
norms that form theory’s building blocks are more-or-less timeless and immediately
accessible. Producing theory that is conceived as the work of a strongly situated
creator, working with as well as for a context, necessarily means taking the time for
appropriate immersion and negotiation*doing slow theory. But theory work
conceived as comparatively detached and acontextual facilitates the view that there
are no strong or serious time constraints on the tasks involved.
Theory’s recommended speeds
Slow theory’s approach to theory production feeds through into its content, which
tends to consist of recommendations focused on political processes. Outcomes of
democratic processes need to be considered as radically open and processes need to
be attuned and attentive to context. Process-oriented accounts see democratic
procedures as enacting norms that may produce democratic legitimacy*a view that
builds in strong recognition that time must be taken, and allowed, for democratic
procedures to do their complex and often meandering work. It is widely perceived
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that democracy*sometimes frustratingly*takes time. Several observers have noted
that trends towards social and technological acceleration may pose a threat to
democracy, constricting or truncating of time-taking democratic procedures in the
name decisiveness or efficiency.15 In this context, it is reasonable to presume that
democratic models that emphasise participative and deliberative procedures reflect
assumptions characteristic of slow theory.
Although questions of time and speed have not featured in debates around
deliberation and democracy, there is clearly a connection. Deliberation*whether
through specially designed forums or through more diffuse processes of debate,
information, and solution-seeking16*requires a quite open-ended approach to
taking time in order that deliberation may bolster the democratic legitimacy of
outcomes. Deliberative conceptions of democracy are obliged to value time-
taking because they emphasise the legitimacy-conferring properties of democratic
procedures.
From the perspective of fast theory, by contrast, the content of the products of
theory consist primarily of recommendations in terms of political outcomes. These
outcomes reflect an argument from independently accessible democratic norms. An
example can be found in David Held’s emphasis on constitutionalised rights for
cosmopolitan democracy*rights that demand respect and protection quite sepa-
rately from the procedural vicissitudes of democratic majorities in different countries
or regions.17 Such rights are constantly present in that they do not need to be
revisited, deliberated over (except by judges), or filtered through popular institutions.
The outcome-oriented content of fast democratic theory is exemplified also by
Young’s working from an independent philosophical conception of justice to deduce
key features of a model of global democracy. The nature of a global democracy is
specifiable, as deduced through the ‘vision’ of the lone theorist and her foundational
norm of justice: ‘As part of such a vision I propose a global system of regulatory
regimes to which locales and regions related in a federated system’.18 To put the
point bluntly, fast theory is able to deliver a more-or-less complete artefact or model
(such as a model of global democracy), often built around a small set of core,
independently derived normative assumptions or concepts.
Fast theory also tends to be relaxed about recommending more or less complete
answers to complex problems. This does not mean, of course, that its democratic
models can be thrown together rapidly and applied instantly. Rawls’s A Theory of
Justice is by any measure an extraordinary work that took shape over years if not
decades of focused and dedicated labour. But independently of the theorist’s human
powers, there is no necessary temporal constraint on theory production or
application. Perhaps fast theory represents the type of thinking that Peter Sloterdijk
had in mind by creating the ‘pneumatic parliament’, a ‘global instant object’ that self-
inflates for immediate use by grateful citizens when dropped from a military plane.19
Fast theory produces something analogous to global instant objects. It offers more-
or-less complete democratic models, which are more-or-less instantly available.
Slow theory
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Theory’s implied speeds
A third factor characterising the slowfast spectrum is the sense of breadth of
applicability of democratic models and theories or their presumed degree of ready
mobility across culture and context.
In terms of slow theory’s understanding of reach of application of democratic
models, theory has a variable, more-or-less impeded capacity for travel from one
geographical or cultural context to another and requires careful and reflexive
translation in new contexts. Slow theory resists assumptions of unproblematic or
immediate translation of its core procedural principles into practice across diverse
contexts; it does not assume the direct cultural availability of its core principles to any
(given) audience.
Slow theory is suspicious of, for example, normative recommendations that
assume a timeless applicability across diverse contexts. It takes responsibility for
theory’s tendency to construct selectively worlds that fit its demands and seeks to
minimise its impact. In the hope of insight, it recommends slow, careful, patient
looking, and learning. It does not assume that its norms or recommendations can
‘travel’ untrammelled across politicalcultural particularities or that its implied speed
of application is virtually instantaneous.
Fast theory can be seen as theory that is reluctant to concede that time may alter its
conclusions or premises or that context may alter the breadth of its applicability. It
assumes a more-or-less unimpeded capacity to travel and to be readily translatable
across varied political, cultural, linguistic, and other contexts. From this perspective,
the world resembles sufficiently a single repeating type of political space in the form
of nation-states.20 Fast theory generalises from assumptions about universal proper-
ties of its own methods and prescriptions to the enabling homogeneity of the world it
seeks both to reflect and to change.21
Fast theory largely sets aside concern about the consequences of its own
situatedness for the reach and applicability of its prescriptions. It is theory
‘unfiltered’ by time and space in terms of both its origins and where it may apply.
The ‘stickiness’, plurality, and particularly of countries, localities, regions, cultures,
linguistic communities, situated histories, and so on are factors to step back from, to
be perceived in a facilitatively blurred fashion, rather than factors conditioning the
scope of a model’s applicability.
A further key issue is recognising that political theories in part construct the worlds
that they are deemed to be applicable to. Liberal theories of justice or democracy
tend to construct the objects of the theory as more-or-less autonomous individuals
who are separable for relevant normative and political purposes from the cultural,
linguistic, or historical context in which they live*think, for example, of the
individualism and implied universality of the assumptions underlying, and providing
the conditions of possibility for, the analysis in Rawls’s A Theory of Justice. Fast
theory, to put the point in general terms, assumes a relatively timeless position of
authority and a speedy, cross-contextual applicability. It takes a view of the nature of
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its product*a normative theory of democracy, for example*which links its general
applicability to its relatively timeless, acontextual derivation.
Fast theory constructs a world tailored to maximising the breadth of its own
salience. Consider for example a little-acknowledged pitfall of debates on ‘global
democracy’. The very phrase implies a constitutable single polity, which according to
our standard assumptions requires a unified system of formal representation. But it
was Hobbes who first made clear that it is the ‘Unity of the Representer’ that makes a
‘people’ a unity out of radical difference or diversity. Global democracy as an idea
bears an implicit claim about a global polity; it thereby conveys a sense of a more-
or-less achieved state of affairs (a ‘global polity’) along with a characteristic way in
which it might best be organised (‘global democracy’). It gives shape, performatively,
to its object.22 Further, naming the global involves ‘implicitly reinscribing a
particular spatial and disciplinary framing’.23 Paley shows that an anthropological
view can lead to questioning of what the standards are for ‘global democracy’.24
Could academic and political pointing out/to ‘the global’ constitute rather than
reflect its object?25
SLOW AND FAST THEORY*AN INTERIM ASSESSMENT
The case for a slow theory approach to transnational political representation is built
on the conviction that there is a strong, thick particularity haunting theorising on
‘global democracy’. This is the case especially in respect of the local, contested
character and significance of the objects of the theorising*individual and group
identities, issues, debates, confrontations, competing bodies of expertise and
evidence, political space, cultural and linguistic frames of reference*and the politics
of simplifying and systematising it. Further, as noted above, slow theory may also be
especially pertinent in a transnational context in that national boundaries and
familiar forms of national governing structures*which may foster national-level fast
theory democratic solutions because the contours of culture and choice are better
established*are largely absent or inapplicable.
There are several reasons to be sceptical of fast theory when addressing
transnational politics. First, there is no settled or prescribed unit for democracy in
transnational spaces, no clear geographical or functional gap or vacuum to be filled;
plurality and diversity in political conceptions of spaces and peoples are rife. Second,
how ‘democracy’ is invoked varies enormously across transnational spaces and is
contested in highly diverse ways (see the perspective of Arundhati Roy regarding
Indian debates, for example26). Generalising about democratic possibilities in such
contexts should be treated with great care (democratic designs are situated designs,
even if they show promise of transfer or adaption). Third, whatever the theorists say
or do, practitioners and activists will do the bulk of the democratic designing
(whether they know they are doing it or not).
Slow theory seeks to immerse itself in the distinctiveness of the objects of
its concern, for example, claims and disputes about transnational democratic
Slow theory
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possibilities. It sees models of democracy as emerging from highly varied efforts to
interpret and to practice an open-ended set of principles (equality, freedom, rights,
participation, accountability . . . ), and new ideas of democracy as co-productions
over time between practitioners, activists, and theorists. Advocating slow theory does
not mean advocating the simple (versus complex), the local (versus global), the
concrete (versus abstract), or the essential (versus the dynamic), for example. A non-
detached, in-depth, process-oriented approach to the work of democratic design
produces its own abstractions, complexities, and sense of dynamic change in a
complexly interconnected world.
CHARACTERISING TRANSNATIONAL REPRESENTATION
Conventionally, political representation is viewed as an institutional arrangement,
resulting from election. But it is more productively regarded as a process of claim-
making and claim-reception that is relatively unconfined by national borders or
electoral structures.27 Certain characteristics of the claim-based approach to
representation are helpful when investigating democratic practice in transnational
politics, where election and formal office are more diffuse or less frequently available,
along with the anchoring effect of a recognised constitutional system.
Crucially, even in transnational spaces we find representative claims that are
reasonably described as democratic. Substantiating that claim and the role of slow
approaches in so doing is a key task. Because familiar institutions of formal
representative democracy are rare at a transnational level with the significant and
partial exception of the European Union, we need to be attentive to unfamiliar forms
of representative claim and their reception. I make no assumptions about how much
transnational democratic representation exists; how we might approach that question
is precisely the point. Nor do I focus on any one type of transnational actor (or style
of action or interaction). Governmental and intergovernmental bodies, non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), corporations, and individuals operating more
or less autonomously or through networks28 are all, in principle, included.
Representative practices in transnational spaces are likely to be characterised by
the following features in comparison to conventional statal representative democracy.
1. Highly diverse forms of institutional presence: the form representative claims
take will vary widely. Their longevity and the extent to which they are linked to
or implicate persisting institutions (such as the UN) will also vary widely. For
example, an indigenous activist group in country X may emerge on the world
scene as claiming to represent indigenous rights with respect to mining and land
use, achieve some profile and impact, and become politically invisible a few
months later. Or a persistent claim over many years might be made by a group
claiming to represent peoples subject to the deprivations of poverty across a
number of countries, such as Oxfam.
2. The operation of multiple modes of exit and voice. This means that the extent to
which, and the ways in which, those invoked in a representative claim are able to
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express their assent or dissent will vary widely. For example, implicated peoples
may have had a chance to accept or reject Bono’s now-famous claim to
‘represent a lot of people in Africa’, but not via conventional voting. It may be
that*for example, for transnational NGOs*one might advocate an adapted use
of more conventional electoral machinery,29 but that particular set of modes of
‘exit’ is at best likely to operate alongside other, often less formal, ones.
3. Variable degrees, styles, and claims with regard to authority. Representative
claimants at the World Bank, for example, may be able to claim some formal
authority from their support from national governments. Others may claim
informal authority; Subcommandante Marcos of the Zapatista Army, for
example, may be able to claim some degree of moral authority in terms of
international representative claims.30 Some will claim to be ‘in’ authority, others
to be ‘an’ authority.
4. Variability in the extent to which representative claims invoke specific bounded
geographical territory. Transnational claims to represent indigenous rights, for
example, may invoke the issues of cultural oppression, or they may invoke rights
to control or sovereignty with regard to territory.
5. A great fluidity in number, frequency, and type from one month or year to the
next. For example, claims to represent ‘Islam’ and the interests of a ‘Muslim
community’ across as well as within nation-states and regions have been
prominent in recent years. A few decades ago such claims would have been
different in character and prominence. But in the 1950s, for instance, claims
on transnational stages to represent the interests of workers across many
countries would have had more prominence than today.
6. Highly varied degrees of political visibility with respect, for example, to which
would-be representative voices are seen or heard where, framed how, and with
what degree of consistency and intensity. Of course, political visibility is a
complex issue in itself, encompassing various forms of media and their
ownerships and cultures, along with other facts making up what we might call
an ‘opportunity structure’ for the effective voicing of political concerns or
interests in transnational politics.
7. Claims are also likely to make distinctive use of ‘types’ of representation as
resources backing up representative claims. The head of the corporate citizen-
ship arm of a major international oil company or the executive director of an
international human rights organisation cannot easily*at least openly or
rhetorically*makes claims to be a ‘representative’. Such terms are too closely
tied, generally speaking, to formal election. This is the main reason why other
terms are often used such as stakeholders, champions, spokespersons, or
advocates.
8. These claims are likely to display also a clearer tendency to be constitutive of the
constituencies that they aim to represent. Elected members of national
parliaments can claim that their constituencies are formal, given, pre-formed
(though they are not, in many ways). The relatively open-ended, informal, and
potential character of ‘constituencies’ for (especially non-elective) representative
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claims in transnational contexts means that those constituencies are more fully
brought into being as an effect of the representative claim itself. Of course,
all representative claims are constitutive claims*a claim to speak for is also a
claim to speak about*but some claims are more fully and more successfully
constitutive than others.
9. Less anchored in specific or formal modes or practices of accountability to a
given constituency. A number of recent observers have discussed the vexed issue
of accountability of transnational non-governmental organisations, among other
transnational actors. Such accounts add, for example, the potential of financial,
moral, professional, and other modes of accountability to electoral or hierarch-
ical accountability.31
So, beyond representative democracy in nation-states, we enter a dynamic and
changeable domain of representative claim-making.32 But some claims in this wider
domain can make a reasonable case to be regarded as examples of democratic
representation, despite common assumptions that transnational representation will
not be democratic representation.33 I turn now to the question of how these
assessments might be made and to the importance of slow theory to their making.
SLOW THEORY: THE POLITICS OF (TAKING) TIME
Some prominent commentators do not think there is a major issue regarding the
democratic character of actors in ‘global civil society’. Castells, for example, sees an
emerging network state*offering political representation that is ‘much more obscure
and removed from political control’*confronted by transnational global movements
and NGOs that make up a ‘democratic movement that calls for new forms of political
representation of peoples’ will and interests in the process of global governance’.34
But we would be wrong to take this view for granted. By the same token, it is also
important to be sceptical of approaches that border on rejecting any link between
democracy and representation in transnational politics, as in Hardt and Negri’s
comment that ‘We need to invent different forms of representation or perhaps new
forms of democracy that go beyond representation’.35
Not closing down the very possibility of forms of democratic representation in
transnational spaces raises a challenge: we need, for any given case, to do a lot of
interpretive work to assess the democratic character of representative claims on their
merits. The principle for such assessments is, I suggest, that provisionally acceptable
claims to democratic legitimacy are those for which there is evidence of sufficient
acceptance by appropriate constituencies over time under reasonable conditions of
judgment.36 So, for example, a claim by Oxfam to speak for specific groups of people
in developing countries can only properly be assessed by those groups themselves.
Contained within this position are arguments that: judgements of democratic
legitimacy of representative claims are properly made by the people subject to
the claim and not, for example, by the claimant or by democratic theorists or
other observers; it is actual, rather than hypothetical, acceptance or rejection of
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representative claims that matters; at best, representative claims can only be
provisionally regarded as democratic; conditions under which judgements are made
by the people subject to the claims also matter (for example, were people coerced into
accepting a claim? Could they have chosen otherwise?); and acceptance acts may
come in a variety of forms*silence, for example, in certain contexts may be taken as
assent or consent.37
Observing the dynamics of a representative claim like Oxfam’s, for example, or by
an indigenous people’s advocacy group such as Survival International or even an
international government body such as the World Bank, is a complex matter and
critically takes time. Interpretation of who may make up the appropriate constituency
for such claims is not straightforward and can only be done effectively through
careful interpretive (as opposed to stipulative) work over time. Crucially, listening to
the voices or watching for signs of a claim’s acceptance will be challenging and
require patient exploration. The democratic theorist will need to do slow theory: to
see the normative content of their projects as emergent, provisional, cumulative, and
co-produced*perhaps haphazardly*rather than as acontextual, potentially com-
plete, fully justified, or accurately captured by their favoured models and concepts.
Over-time, slow assessments allow for alternative readings of claims to surface*
meanings of claim, representation, leadership, and accountability may play through
and play out in context. A slow, open-ended ‘time-lapse’ view may capture shifting
manifestations of representative claims and potential constituencies better than a fast
‘snapshot’, e.g. through the parachuting into a given context pre-formulated
accountability roles.
Observers of specific sets of claims will need to allow time, for example, for the
ingredients that enable assessment to become sufficiently manifest. This will involve,
importantly, denying an immediate, stipulative assumption of illegitimacy of
representative claims (an assumption that is often made for non-elective claims,
for example). This is democratic theory as methodical, patient detective work. In a
great many cases*especially in the fluid circumstances of transnational politics*
clues regarding the democratic acceptability of specific claims will need to be pieced
together. The observer will need the fruits of detailed interpretive work to find out if
the acceptance of claims (or a reasonable process of non-objection) is evident in a
given case. We can’t know if a representative claim has been accepted unless we are
prepared to explore the meanings of that claim for those citizens subject to it or
invoked and addressed by it. It follows also that notions of provisional acceptability
are important. That point becomes stronger the more we stress the importance of the
constituency standpoint for these assessments.
There are circumstances, then, in which representative claims can reasonably be
regarded as provisionally democratic, even if they are not based on an elective or even
a formal relationship. There are, of course, degrees of formality and degrees of
election involved in many claims and relationships*this is not a black-and-white
issue. Surrogate representation, as discussed by Mansbridge,38 is one variant of
more-or-less non-elective representation, tied to national contexts in discussions to
date but translatelable into transnational spheres. It is true that the comparative
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absence of an electoral base for representative claims can make assessment of their
democratic character more difficult. But in a way that is just the point: that difficulty
demands time, a slow theory approach attuned to evidence of actual acceptance by
appropriate constituencies.
A range of factors will be part of such assessments. The Transnational
Governmental Organisations (TGOs), International Non-governmental Organisa-
tions (INGOs), or networks through which both operate may claim or be claimed to
be representative. Whether representative claims by INGOs or transnational
corporations in ‘corporate citizenship’ mode are constant or ongoing; whether they
originate from within or without the organisation; whether these claims are many and
common or isolated and rare; and the extent to which they are disputed by observers
who are not necessarily part of the appropriate constituency are all factors that are
subordinate to acceptance or rejection by members of appropriate constituencies
over time but still may provide important evidence for the investigator.
How long is long enough to know if a given claim has earned a degree of democratic
legitimacy, taking the relevant factors into account? There can be no single answer. It
may depend in part on the character and scope of particular claims, along with the
quality of the information available. The best broad answer is: long enough for most if
not all the members of the appropriate constituency to have registered objections to it
in a context that enables those objections to be raised at no significant cost to the
actors concerned. That, at least, is a reasonable regulative principle.
There may be reason to ask: do such assessments matter, especially if they are so
difficult? One perspective from which they might be argued not to matter may arise
from the analysis of Goodin, who argues that it makes little sense for us to think that
global democracy will arrive quickly: compared to the development of liberal
democracy in nation-states, global democracy is in its infancy.39 But there is plentiful
evidence that, slowly and haltingly, it is and will continue to evolve. One might argue
that there is little point seeking ways to assess the democratic character of
representative claims for transnational actors*we would not expect to find much
democracy in that context, yet (Goodin does not himself make this argument).
However, we do make such assessments, and they matter to the practical capacities
of organisations as diverse as the World Bank, Oxfam, and Survival International.
Seen from another angle, Goodin’s arguments might put assessments of claims in the
vanguard of the gradual development towards some form of global democracy. If the
latter may emerge by small, slow, uneven steps, then a slow theory-driven approach
that identifies detailed and situated increments in democratic practice in transna-
tional spaces may be welcomed. Indeed, oddly enough, it may tell us more about the
emergent character of something called ‘global democracy’*the end point of which
we ought not to assume will take the familiar form of statal representative democracy.
There may well be a ‘one-way ratcheting up’ process towards ‘global democracy’,40
but I would argue that just what is being ratcheted up in specific claims and disputes
is a more open question than we may commonly think.41
Sometimes*perhaps more often than it is realised*the tasks of democratic theory
require adoption of key features of slow theory, such as immersion in the context of
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material political worlds and the frames through which participants interpret those
worlds.
CONTRASTS
I have suggested that in the fluidity and variability of transnational politics,
representative claims may be made by and about a variety of actors. Some of these
claims may involve democratic representation and some not. Resisting the
attractions*and they are real attractions*of what I have called ‘fast theory’,
I have suggested an interpretive way to assess the extent to which appropriate
constituencies of representative claims accept those claims. And I have emphasised
that doing slow theory means keeping a sense of provisionality over time of the
outcomes of these assessments.
My position differs from others taken in debates about global democracy and
transnational democratic representation. I will comment briefly on the work of
Held, Dryzek and Niemeyer, Castiglione and Warren, and Bohman.42 There is, of
course, more to these works than my brief comments will suggest. But by way
of conclusion, I simply note some key points of distinction.
First, the myriad practices of democratic representation in transnational spaces are
more significant than a too-rapid, too-complete, pre-fabricated model of ‘global
representative democracy’. Both Held and Dryzek and Niemeyer, for example,
prioritise the institutional form that transnational representation might take (e.g.
global parliaments or Chambers of Discourses). To give it this priority is to go too far
too soon; the shapes of democracy in transnational spaces will emerge, unevenly and
over time, in complex ways. A key task of political theory is to adapt its tools to the
analysis of its emergence, to attend to the fate of a range of representative claims.
Held’s cosmopolitan model of democracy envisages transnational representation as
occurring in layered or nested levels of formal representative institutions from the
global to the local. For Dryzek and Niemeyer, representing discourses is a more
promising route to democratising transnational spaces than more conventional
representation of interests or opinions: and ‘discursive representation is especially
appropriate where a well-bounded demos is hard to locate’.43 But although they
recognise that discourses ‘can evolve with time’, and are constitutive of interests and
identities, a good deal of their discussion is devoted to bold advocacy of Chambers of
Discourses*more or less formal representative bodies*‘It is possible to imagine a
Chamber of Discourses corresponding to more familiar assemblies based on the
representation of individuals’.44
Secondly, the focus on formality, in Bohman’s45 and Held’s work for example,
often runs in tandem with a continuing and restrictive focus on the narrower domain
of representative democracy-style institutions, rather than on the broader and less
structured domains of democratic and political representation. The willingness to
step back and to model or design more or less ideal institutions for transnational
democratic representation is a familiar political theorist’s impulse. It is an impulse
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worth resisting. We need to do immersive theory*theory that pays close and detailed
attention to a range of emergent practices*formal and informal, institutional and
non-institutional*such as claims and their reception by different constituencies
and audiences.
Thirdly, we need to keep an open mind about the extent of conceptual innovation
needed to understand practices and possibilities in the difficult wider domains of
democratic representation. For example, Castiglione and Warren are concerned that
we need to emphasise new forms of accountability where conventional electoral
authorisation is relatively absent.46 This is fine, as far as it goes. But my
recommendation to look at the relatively unfamiliar notion of acceptance by
constituencies is, I would maintain, a necessary innovation. Using acceptance rather
than accountability allows more for the rapid and unpredictable changes in who may
be invoked as part of representative claims (accountability implies a more persistent
and readily identifiable group of constituents).47 Of course, the performance of
representative claims may involve invoking a sense of authorisation or accountability.
Relatedly, it is better to emphasise practices over institutions, and trace potentially
emergent properties of institutionalisation rather than positing ‘this is democracy’
end points. For one thing, as Rosenau has made clear, we do not know which if any
of the emergent institutional configurations in transnational spaces will crystallise
into widely accepted and lasting forms of democratic practice.48
CONCLUSION
In any process of theory-building, there is a judgement to be made about the
character and extent of the gap or gaps between the systematising theory, on the one
hand, and the cultural and material states of the world that our theories simplify. Go
to one extreme and our theories (as representations of external states) are almost as
complex and variable as the states of affairs they claim to model. That is the paradox
that Borges often explored in his short stories (‘The Congress’ especially). But there
is also the other extreme, where theoretical models and principles are so spare or
parsimonious that they look over-simplified, over-optimistic, and unconvincing in
the face of their objects’ changeability and complexity.
Fast theory*especially theory that posits independently constructed institutional
models or designs*can move quickly to its conclusions partly because it flies fast
and high above the earth’s political topography. The world looks flat and uniform
from a great height, and the extent to which one is speeding over difference and
complexity is obscured. Better, I argue, to go ‘slow and low’. Better, in other words,
to appreciate topographical complexities; to embrace an attentive and responsive
pragmatism rather than rush to offer comparatively timeless solutions.
Democratic theory’s new global canvas has prompted global democratic ambitions.
Focusing on representation, I have sketched reasons to embrace slow theory*
attentive, modest, and interpretive*rather than forms of fast theory that tend to
reach for neater and more conventional institutional responses. I have argued that we
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need to pause and reflect on the messiness of transnational representation, and that
this very need has an impact on the character of the work of democratic theory. Above
all, I invite reflection on the slow-burn power of in-time and timely ideas and the
surprising lack of purchase or relevance of would-be timeless, fast theory.
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